By Tarique Ghaffur QPM CBE, Chairman 

Introduction

Whilst in India on a previous visit, I had the pleasure of meeting one of its finest Police Chiefs, Rakesh Maria, who briefed me first hand on the volumetrics and complexities of policing a major city like Mumbai.  I also have many friends from Mumbai who tell me about the scale of the issues facing its police service every day. It is clear that protecting a major city like Mumbai would never be easy.

Therefore, I am sure that the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, between the 26th to 29th November, will have been devastating for such a proud city and a proud country, which has been growing in economic strength and international recognition in recent years.   

As the tragic events in Mumbai unfolded in the full gaze of the world media last week, there was a certain element of predictability around the sequence of responses from both within India and across the world. The initial trauma and dismay at the ferocity and audacity of the attacks, evolved quickly into understandable anger and then into the inevitable politics of blame. As the city returns to some semblance of ‘normality’ this week, my thoughts returned to the events of 7th July 2005, the  first time in London that we had experienced multiple and simultaneous home-grown terrorist attacks that were indiscriminate in nature and resulted in mass fatalities and casualties across all communities. Those attacks changed London forever and brought about a new reality for everyone, just as the Mumbai attacks are likely to bring a new reality to the city and to India.

While there may be many operational and strategic issues to consider in relation to these attacks, I would like to pay tribute at the outset to the police officers, soldiers and members of the public, both Indian and foreign, who have undoubtedly performed many acts of bravery, both reported and unreported, either to save their own and other lives or to make the ultimate sacrifice, in what was an unprecedented attack in this city.

Globalisation, Terrorism and Organised Crime

We are currently living through an historic transition that is being fuelled by some dynamic processes of change: improved digital communications and information technologies increased blurring of national borders, greater mobility of people, goods and services across countries, and the emergence of a globalised economy. Unfortunately, this process of globalisation also has a dark side: the expanding opportunities are just as attractive to the entrepreneurial spirit of criminal and terrorist groups as they are to the legitimate business world. In this new global age, business is booming, but unfortunately so is international organised crime and terrorism.

Since the 9/11 attacks, the transformation of the international security environment in response to the terrorist threat has been preoccupying many governments.  However, it is equally important to note that while the focus remains firmly fixed on countering global terrorism, organised crime continues to flourish under the radar.

 As the legitimate sources of money are being closed off, terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah have involved themselves in an array of criminal enterprises, including drug sales, credit card fraud, armed robbery and the illicit sale of counterfeit cigarettes, pharmaceuticals, DVDs and other goods. An estimated 12.5 billion ÚS dollars derived from drug trafficking from Morocco, was believed to have funded the 2004 Madrid rail bomb attack, along with other terrorist incidents. As a consequence, I believe that the emerging synergy between globalisation, criminal networks and terrorism will undoubtedly become the marque of international policing and security in the 21st Century.

Because of difficulties around penetration, limited information exists generally about global terrorist networks like al-Qaeda and estimates of network size are therefore extremely varied. However, certain characteristics have become apparent from analysing the global experience:

• They have a ‘fuzzy’ organizational structure with only limited central oversight.
• They operate in small local independent tight-knit cells and are therefore difficult to penetrate.
• They are patient, working to long term goals based on a common cause.
• They are prepared to engage in indiscriminate multiple and simultaneous attacks to inflict mass fatalities and casualties using whatever means necessary, without concern for their own safety.

This makes such groups extremely hard to track down and the consequences of their actions are often devastating, as we have seen in Mumbai.

There can be little doubt that globalisation has had a major impact on political and special interest terrorism. Leading up to 2001, hundreds of people were killed and thousands injured in terrorist attacks, aimed predominantly against US military personnel and consular staff across the world, including Kenya, Beirut and the World Trade Centre in New York.

But it was the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on the 11th September 2001 that defined the new face of global terrorism that we have been experiencing, including the London, Madrid and Bali bombings. As Peter Clarke, the former Head of the Metropolitan Police Counter-Terrorism Command, said, "The threat from terrorism is real. It is here, it is deadly and it is enduring”.

Terrorism in India

 Terrorism in India is diverse and stems from several direct causes: the country's various Maoist, socialist and Sikh separatist groups, and the continuing cycle of violence between Islamic militants and Hindu nationalist militants, particularly the territorial dispute over India-controlled Kashmir. The key departure I can see in the latest Mumbai attacks has been the primary targeting of wealthy or foreign people, especially wealthy Indians, Westerners and Jewish people, as opposed to the more common focus of Islamist terrorist attacks on public spaces, where the victims were predominantly Hindus.

India has undoubtedly experienced its own increase in the scale and frequency of terrorist attacks over the past decade, with more than 4,000 Indians dying in attacks since 2004 – the highest total of any other nation besides Iraq. In the past six months there have been attacks in Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujurat, Argatala, Imphal and Assam, resulting in hundreds of deaths. Mumbai itself was attacked in a series of bombings in 1993 that killed over 250 people, and again in the 2006 train bombings that killed over 180 people. Each time, the "Mumbai spirit", enabled the city to brush itself down and resume its state of normality. But this time, the situation appears to be different.

Getting a Sense of Perspective

There are many issues that will need to be considered in any review of the Mumbai attacks, but the issue of perspective cannot be ignored. The challenge that faces the Indian authorities in preventing such assaults in the future is immense, not least because of the country’s size and social complexity. In Mumbai, the city's population has doubled in 25 years creating a population of over 13 million, and when combined with the neighbouring suburbs of Navi Mumbai and Thane, the total rises to around 19 million, making it one of the most populous metropolitan areas in the world. More than 60% of the city's population is believed to live in slums. Dharavi, Asia's second largest slum is located in central Mumbai and houses over 1 million people. Therefore it would not be a difficult task for terrorists to achieve anonymity in the city.

Despite the perceived failings in the security response in Mumbai, the fact remains that this type of attack could have occurred in almost any city of the world. 10 men armed with weapons would kill a lot of people before a security intervention could be put into place. Therefore, all large cities are vulnerable to attack; even if London doubled the size of its security resources, there is no way it could protect its hotels, hospitals, religious centres and railway stations from attacks of this type, short of turning them into armed fortresses.

In New York and Washington on 9/11, 19 men armed killed nearly 3,000 people. The 2004 Madrid train bombings involved only a small number of perpetrators to killed 191 people, and in the 2005 bombings on London's Underground, just four terrorists killed 52 people. Each of these attacks was low-tech, caused enormous psychological and economic damage in addition to loss of life, and each occurred in countries with sophisticated security forces. It is against this perspective that I will now discuss the Mumbai attacks.

The Mumbai Attacks

The speculation and commentary around the events that unfolded in Mumbai bbetween the 26th and 29th November was immense. It is not my intention to critique that coverage here, but simply to elicit some basic, commonly agreed facts and identify the key challenges. It would appear that at least 10 suspects entered Mumbai from the coast after hijacking a fishing boat and then carried out their plan to shoot and kill wealthy Indians, Westerners and Jewish people at a number of locations, including two luxury hotels, a rail terminal, a hospital, a popular restaurant and a Jewish centre.

The orchestrated nature of the attacks suggests a well-planned, well equipped operation, including sophisticated communications, carried out by well-trained individuals. While an apparently previously unknown group, Deccan Mujahedeen, have claimed responsibility for the attacks, the general speculation based on the alleged confession of the captured suspect, is that the Mumbai suspects were members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani-based jihadist organization with alleged ties to al Qaeda.

The number of suspects involved has been collated from the nine that were killed and the one suspect that was detained. However, it is possible that other terrorists may still be alive and highly likely that other people were involved in the planning and preparation of an operation of this nature. Interestingly, there is speculation that the essential local logistical support network was provided by the most notorious Mumbai mafia gang, D Company, which is run by Dawood Ibrahim, an organised-crime boss who is widely believed to also have links with al-Qaeda. 

The Security Response

The collective security response to the attacks in Mumbai, at both the local and national government level, seems to have attracted a great deal of criticism, particularly the lack of any clear counter terrorism strategy, the under-funded and inefficient intelligence services and the security service response to the attacks.

In particular, there has been a great deal of focus on the ‘politicisation of terror,’ and with elections only six months away, the pressure on the government appears to be acute. Many observers see a pattern of both government and opposition politicians reflexively seeking scapegoats, externalising the threat and making excuses. The events in Mumbai have already resulted in the resignation of the country's Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, and the chief minister and deputy chief minister of Maharashtra. At the same time, the Mumbai attacks have led to an escalation in tensions with Pakistan. It is at such times of crisis that the political parties need to rise above narrow political considerations and work collaboratively to tackle the international and domestic threats of terrorism.

Counter Terrorism Strategy

In relation to the counter terrorism strategy, the Indian media have reported widespread concerns that despite the unprecedented number of terrorist attacks, the events in Mumbai have further highlighted the ongoing failure to develop a coherent national strategy and credible action plan. This has resulted in calls for a major reform of the country’s security architecture and a need to engage with the international counter terrorism community.

The globalisation of crime and terrorism has now produced a very real security threat that is growing. To counter this threat, the UK has developed a long-term Counter-Terrorism Strategy known as CONTEST.  The focus of CONTEST over the next 5 years is about reducing the risk, by reducing the threat and our vulnerability.

To achieve this, there are four key strands, to:

• PURSUE terrorists and those that sponsor them
• PROTECT the public and UK interests
• PREPARE for the consequences
• PREVENT terrorism by tackling its underlying causes

This is a very clear security strategy that requires focused and sustained collaborative effort across all four stands from a broad range of agencies.

Intelligence Issues

In order to pursue terrorists and those that sponsor them, and protect the public and India’s interests, it is vital that the intelligence processes are working effectively. However, there appears to be a growing consensus that the events in Mumbai merely highlight the significant challenges faced by the Indian intelligence services. Issues raised include poor intelligence-gathering systems, poor coordination and inefficient information-sharing between the various intelligence agencies, under-funding and poor resourcing, difficulties around interception and a dearth of language specialists. It would appear that at least 10 suspects entered Mumbai from the sea, along with an extensive arsenal of weapons, ammunition and grenades. Did anyone witness any part of this process and recognise the potential threat or was the first awareness of this threat by security resources on the ground when the attacks took place?

There is a picture emerging of various prior warnings about these attacks. As far back as 2007, it is alleged that a report was prepared for the Indian Parliament that India's shores could be used to launch terrorist assaults on the country. Indian intelligence agencies are now suggesting that they gave about half a dozen warnings to the government in Maharashtra state that strikes were being planned on city landmarks, including, possibly, the Taj Mahal hotel. A captured Lashkar-e-Taiba operative apparently told Indian interrogators months ago that he had carried out reconnaissance of both the Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels. The head of an Indian fishermens' union also stated that he had warned the government that militants were using sea routes to smuggle explosives four months ago. The agencies have also appeared to have been picking up militant chatter on attacks in the city.

Perhaps more alarming is the fact that a US official told the Associated Press On Tuesday 25th November that the Indian authorities had been told of an apparent plot to launch an attack on Mumbai from the sea. The information gathered was specific enough to cite threats to Mumbai's main hotels, and the possibility that Islamic militants might use boats to penetrate the city's weak coastal defences. ABC News also quoted Indian officials as saying that after receiving the US warning, they also intercepted a satellite phone message on 18th November warning of a seaborne attack on Mumbai.

Any subsequent inquiry should identify the true extent of any intelligence failings in relation to the Mumbai attacks, particularly around the advanced warnings, and identify areas for improvement. However, the real intelligence world is not always as clear cut as it may have been portrayed. One of the problems is that the various Indian intelligence agencies may have received so many warnings that did not come to anything that they grew complacent about taking any of them seriously.

However, the fact remains that intelligence is the lifeblood of security, whether it is in the pursuit of terrorists or in preventing their activity. While there are technical ways of gathering information, the principal sources will always come from the alertness of people living and working in communities. This requires a huge investment in developing community policing and the secure intelligence systems necessary to gain the confidence and reassurance of such communities. Ultimately, you do not have an intelligence system if people are not confident enough to provide information and there are not secure analytical processes in place to turn information into intelligence. Ultimately, information has little real value unless it is properly analysed, disseminated and acted upon.

Capacity & Capability

Beyond intelligence, it is important to have strong capacity and capability i.e. sufficient numbers of properly trained and equipped security resources. I am led to understand that there are nearly half a million armed state police officers and half a million "home guards" in the country, as well as more than 200,000 "central reserve police" responsible for internal security. The Central Bureau of Investigations, the federal law agency, and the Intelligence Bureau also employ tens of thousands. Yet the current ratio of officers to population is around only 122 officers for every 100,000 people, which is considerably lower than many other countries.

More seriously, the Indian police appear to be incapacitated by a lack of money and training. A recent report by a national police research agency showed that the annual training budget for policemen in some states worked out at around 100 rupees (two dollars) per head. Poor working conditions, rudimentary surveillance and communications equipment, inadequate forensic science laboratories and outdated weaponry are making matters worse. For instance, ordinary policemen have been apparently issued with ancient single-bolt Lee-Enfield .303 rifles, which they have typically fire 10 times total during training. Poorly trained and equipped security resources will always be at a disadvantage when faced with with well trained and equipped terorrists, determined to engage in indiscriminate multiple and simultaneous attacks to inflict mass fatalities and casualties using whatever means necessary, without concern for their own safety.

Analysts have also noted weaknesses in maritime security and the lack of coordination among the different security agencies. Despite the approach to the city by sea and the merging intelligence picture of this threat, the terrorists passed through a crowded fishing colony either unnoticed or without any challenge. The Coast Guard, the primary agency responsible for guarding the coastline, appears to have similar challenges around personnel and infrastructure to do its job. The Mumbai Coast Guard seems to have only a handful of patrol boats, and lacks state-of-the-art radar, surveillance equipment and speedboats.

The use of coastal route by terrorists to pass undetected into Mumbai has exposed the vulnerability of the country’s coastline. However, no border of a nation the size of India will ever be entirely secure from routine security measures. The maritime border alone stretches for some 7,516 kilometres with 12 major and 180 minor ports. That is why when you get specific intelligence about a threat in a specific area it must to be actioned in an appropriate and sustained manner. 

[continued .....Part 2]