Introduction
In late November 2008, I felt compelled to set out some reflections on the tragic events that took place in Mumbai, India. It is therefore with further sadness that just three months later, I find myself reflecting on the tragic events in Lahore, the capital of Punjab province and the second-largest city in Pakistan. I make no apology for reiterating some of the key issues that I raised in my earlier reflections because they remain valid.
While there are clearly a number of operational and strategic issues to consider in relation to the Lahore attack, right from the outset I would like to pay tribute to the police officers, cricketers and officials, who have undoubtedly performed acts of bravery, both reported and unreported, either to save their own and other lives or to make the ultimate sacrifice, in what was a terrible attack.
We are currently living through an historic transition that is being fuelled by some dynamic processes of change: population growth, rapid urbanisation, globalisation, environmental degradation, the development and spread of digital technology, and geopolitical instability. For a number of countries, the threat of single-issue terrorism, often based around such aspects as separatism or political dissension, has been around for many years. However, there can be little doubt that globalisation has had a major impact on political and special interest terrorism.
Leading up to 2001, hundreds of people were killed and thousands injured in terrorist attacks, aimed predominantly against US military personnel and consular staff across the world, including Kenya, Beirut and the World Trade Centre in New York.
But it was the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on the 11th September 2001 that defined the new face of global terrorism that we have been experiencing, including the London, Madrid and Bali bombings. Unfortunately, despite the extensive global law enforcement effort, no country can consider itself immune to terrorist attack. As Peter Clarke, the former Head of the London-based Metropolitan Police Counter-Terrorism Command, said, "The threat from terrorism is real. It is here, it is deadly and it is enduring”.
The superimposition of the global terrorist threat onto what is an already fragile system has raised serious concerns about safety and security globally and changed the political landscape forever. As a consequence, the traditional pillars of safety and security (safety of the individual, security of the community and security of services and systems) have needed to become much more responsive and resilient.
In this light, this article is intended to be a catalyst for debate rather than criticism of what was clearly a challenging critical incident. The challenge that faces the Pakistan authorities in preventing terrorist attacks now and in the future is immense, not least because of the country’s size and social complexity. The population in 2008 was estimated to be around 172,800,000, making it the 6th most populated country in the world. This could rise to nearly 180 million by the end of this decade. In Lahore alone, the city's population has been estimated at around 10 million, which makes it the second largest city in Pakistan after Karachi and the 26th largest city in the world. More than three million people are believed to live in the city’s 250 slums. Therefore it would not be a difficult task for terrorists to achieve anonymity in this or any other major Pakistan city.
Terrorism in Pakistan
Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan’s diverse and heterogeneous cultures, languages, traditions and customs have produced a complexity of conflict and violence seldom experienced anywhere else in the world. This terrorist violence in Pakistan has been attributed to a number of direct causes: the country’s various secessionist movements, including Baluchistan and Sindh provinces; sectarianism between majority Sunni and minority Shia Muslims; the propagation of violent extremist ideology and associated insurgent groups, such as the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba; the availability of firearms and explosives; and Pakistan's thousands of unregulated madrassas, some of which are known to have provided terrorist training. The combination of these factors creates an extremely volatile and challenging security landscape.
On closer examination of the situation in Pakistan, the scale and complexity of this violence is immense. Sectarian violence involving militants from the Sunni and Shia Muslim sects has claimed more than 4,000 lives in Pakistan since the late 1980s. From the summer of 2007 to late 2008, more than 1,500 people have died in a wave of Islamist militant attacks on civilians. Similarly, inter-tribal violence and fighting between government forces and Islamist militants linked to the Taliban or al Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (particularly North and South Waziristan) and the North West Frontier Province (particularly the Swat Valley) have also resulted in thousands of deaths on both sides.
In addition, there has been almost continuous violent conflict in the province of Baluchistan, sporadic violence by Sindh nationalists, attacks on Pakistani Christians and foreigners by militant Muslim groups and continuing tensions in the disputed Kashmir region. Some of the more high profile attacks have included various attempts to murder former President General Musharraf, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Karachi and the bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad. As a consequence, Pakistan is experiencing many ongoing and simultaneous violent fronts within its own borders that are extremely difficult to control.
The Lahore Attack
The speculation and commentary around the events that unfolded in Lahore on the 3rd March 2009 has been immense. It is not my intention to critique that coverage here, but simply to elicit some basic, commonly agreed facts and identify the key challenges. It would appear that at around 8.30am a convoy comprising the Sri Lankan players’ and umpires coaches, police jeeps, motorcycles and an ambulance, left the Pearl Intercontinental hotel for the 15-minute drive to the Gaddafi Stadium. It would also appear that the Pakistani players’ coach and convoy left at 8.35am on this day, unlike the previous two days when they had all travelled together in one convoy. On this occasion it is suggested that the Sri Lankan convoy took a different route to the cricket stadium through Liberty market, rather than the previous route along the canal.
At around 8.40am, as the Sri Lankan convoy approached the roundabout at Liberty Market, a rocket appeared to be fired at the players’ coach that flew over the top of the vehicle. A suspect then ran in front of the bus and threw a grenade that rolled under the coach and exploded after the coach had passed over it. Two white cars then drove in reverse towards the convoy and the occupants began firing on the convoy, joined by others who had arrived at the scene by rickshaws. The coach stood still for about a minute and a half as the attackers fired at will, before driving off at speed to the safety of the Gaddafi stadium. The police vans and the bus carrying the umpires then came under consistent fire. CCTV footage shows eight of the attackers spraying the team bus and police with automatic fire from AK-47 assault rifles, working in pairs, using walkie-talkies and wearing backpacks over civilian dress. The movement of the suspects did not suggest that they were coming under any significant return fire from the police.
The estimate length of the attack was around 30 minutes, before the attackers finally made good their escape. CCTV footage showed several suspects apparently escaping down a side street on motorcycles as well as four of the suspects walking or jogging into a marketplace from the attack site holding their weapons. No police were seen and all the suspects left the scene unchallenged.
Journalists were later shown weapons found at the scene and at other locations, including 10 AK-47 rifles, two rocket grenade launchers and 3 kilograms of plastic explosives and a detonating cable, along with medical supplies and sufficient food and water to last several days. During the whole attack eight people died, including six police officers and at least eight people were injured.
The subsequent investigation has involved the arrest of a large number of people. However, there have been conflicting accounts of the investigation's progress; while senior government officials have been claiming that the attackers had been identified, admissions by police sources suggest that progress in identifying the suspects has been very slow.
The Security Response
The collective security response to the attack in Lahore at both the national and local government level, seems to have attracted a great deal of criticism, particularly around the lack of any clear security strategy, potential intelligence failings, the level of protection offered to the Sri Lankan convoy and the police response to the attacks.
Many observers have made great play about the similarities between the Mumbai and Lahore attacks, referring to the number of attackers, their firepower and supplies, use of walkie-talkies and the ease with which they carried out the attacks. On the surface, this comparison does have some merit. However, one critical difference between the attacks in Mumbai and Lahore was the nature of the targets. In Mumbai, the targets included two luxury hotels, a rail terminal, a hospital, a popular restaurant and a Jewish centre. The fully armed attackers initially went up against totally unarmed civilians, until armed police were deployed to what had developed into a chaotic operating environment. Despite the perceived failings in the security response in Mumbai, the fact remains that this type of attack could have occurred in almost any city of the world. In New York and Washington on 9/11, 19 men armed killed nearly 3,000 people. The 2004 Madrid train bombings involved only a small number of perpetrators to killed 191 people, and in the 2005 bombings on London's Underground, just four terrorists killed 52 people. Each of these attacks was low-tech, caused enormous psychological and economic damage in addition to loss of life, and each occurred in countries with sophisticated security forces.
The attack in Lahore was significantly different, in that the attackers went up against a specific small and single target passing through a well-established route, with predictable security in place around it. Additionally, this was not a suicide attack as the suspects clearly had an exit strategy which they successfully accomplished. Any emerging concerns from the Lahore attack must therefore relate to operational issues such as the security planning, leadership and command and control.
A senior police official in Lahore initially claimed that the security plan was perfect and the police had very good arrangements in place. Clearly the tragic extent of the breaches of security in the Lahore attack casts serious doubt on that assessment about a plan that appeared to be templated i.e. non-specific and non-bespoke. Fortunately, this robust position was subsequently modified, as officials have come forward and admitted that security breaches did in fact take place. The main admissions focus around the inadequacy of the police vehicles used and the failure of the police backup in the outer cordons to take on the gunmen.
In fact, there are a number of concerns that are immediately obvious, that will hopefully be brought out in the inquiry. It is therefore not my intention to go through them all here, but rather concentrate on several of the more serious issues. Given the prevailing security situation, the Pakistan government had promised the Sri Lankan team "presidential level" security when it agreed to tour the country after several other foreign teams had refused. By this, I take it to only mean the level of protection afforded to former President, General Musharraf, which was of the highest standard. By all accounts, the actual level of security provided to the Sri Lankan team appears to have fallen far short of this standard.
It was also clear that the security configuration appeared to be for an escort, i.e. facilitation through traffic, and not a protection configuration. When the convoy was split by the late departure of the Pakistan team, it appears that the escort was then divided between the two teams, thus potentially reducing any security afforded to both convoys. While there has been little or nothing revealed about the security of the Pakistan convoy, there has been much criticism about the dearth of security around the attacked Sri Lankan convoy. Proper ongoing risk assessment should have been used to determine the appropriate security requirements for each convey before either was allowed to move, not simply distributing the resources immediately available.
A senior police official pointed out that the top priority of the police escorts with the Sri Lankan team was to protect them and transport them to a safe location, not to combat the gunmen. But the simple fact that it was achieved does not in itself make it a good security objective. A second bus containing match officials appears to have been left at the scene under attack, whilst the Sri Lankan coach made it into the stadium. The attackers obviously had access to extensive firepower, but appeared inexperienced in its use, maybe through shortages of ammunition for training. The rocket launcher missed the target, as did the hand grenade. In addition, the Sri Lankan coach apparently had its windshield shattered and only 25 bullet holes after being held at the scene for around 90 seconds.
While the AK47 has a practical rate of fire of 90-100 rounds per minute firing single shots and 400 rounds per minute when fired in bursts, the magazine only holds 30 rounds. Therefore the rate of fire is dependent on how many of these heavy magazines each attacker was able to carry and their proficiency in using the weapons. While twelve attackers armed with AK47s could have laid down extensive fire power over 30 minutes, this does not appear to be the case.
This leads to the another critical issue around who was actually responsible for taking on the attackers? The police and press talk about the use of an elite commando escorting the Sri Lankan convoy, but it is difficult to discover any information about this group, its remit, methods, standards and training However, given the apparently nonchalant attitude of the attackers, I believe any well-trained commando unit would have neutralised a threat of this nature very quickly. Yet it did not happen; while they may look the part, there are concerns from this incident about the level of tactical training or awareness needed for a protection deployment. There did not appear to be any initial response beyond the driver being able to get the Sri Lankan coach away from the location to safety.
One of the first actions when a critical incident occurs is to secure the area and provide a security exclusion zone through armed and unarmed cordons, as appropriate. This provides the first visible representation that the security forces have taken control of the scene. It is my understanding that cordoning off the area took considerable time to put in place, if it ever went in effectively.
The next area of concern is around the secondary response to the incident. The apparent absence of any armed police deployments to the scene for the estimated 30 minute duration of the attack raises significant concerns around command and control of what had become a critical incident. In 30 minutes, resources could have been deployed from a number of miles away, let alone those engaged in outer cordons in the vicinity. Therefore it is difficult to understand what contingency arrangements had been put into place to take on an armed attack on the convoy. Through 30 minutes of attack not one attacker was shot, not one attacker seemed concerned about taking appropriate cover from any return fire and all the suspects left the scene unchallenged. There are clearly some critical operational lessons to be learnt from this tragic incident.
Command and Control
In particular, the attack in Lahore raises some serious questions about the level of command and control and emergency preparedness applied to the convoy of the Sri Lankan team and match officials to the stadium. Unlike Mumbai, which was a planned series of attacks on a city to which the police had to respond, this was a pre-planned security operation. Command and control of the security would therefore have been a vital operational component, as would contingency planning for any emergency.
Yet as the details of the attack have emerged, concerns have been raised about the security planning process, the security risk assessment methodology, the leadership structure, communication, decision-making, accountability and contingency planning.
It is a fairly universally accepted principle that there is a critical ‘golden hour’ where operational responses need to be quick and decisive. The longer it takes for decisive action to be taken, the greater the risk to life and property. In the case of the Lahore attack, the almost complete failure to deploy armed resources to tackle the gunmen gave the attackers considerable time to affect their purpose by killing and injuring innocent people.
A number of countries now use the Gold, Silver and Bronze system of command and control, particularly for major or public order events. This provides a consistent approach to setting the strategy, determining tactics and undertaking the operational delivery. Under this system, the Gold Commander is in overall control of the whole critical situation. They will not be at the scene, but at a distant control room, known as Gold Command, where they will formulate the strategy for dealing with any incident(s). The Silver Commander is the tactical commander who manages the strategic direction from Gold and converts this into sets of actions that are completed by Bronzes. They are not usually located at the scene as they need to be able to take a step back and review all the different operational requirements. A Bronze Commander directly controls the resources at each incident and will be found with their staff working at the scene. If an incident is widespread geographically, different Bronzes would normally assume responsibility for specific locations and even functions. An effective communications system is then required to overlay the structure to ensure that the Gold, Silver and Bronzes are kept well informed.
In terms of convoys, while there remains a key role for the Gold, Silver, Bronze system, it is absolutely vital that it supports rather than detracts from the dynamic risk assessment capabilities and operational autonomy, initiative and innovation required by the protection team leader to maintain protection in the face of immediate life-threatening incidents.
Dealing with the media is another function of command and control. It was also very noticeable that various police and government officials were involved in speaking to the media at various times. A major terrorist attack such as that perpetrated on Lahore will undoubtedly attract the full blaze of global media with continuous breaking news. The degree to which the media are permitted access to critical incident scenes has been a matter of much debate in the UK. There is clearly a desire on the part of the media to get footage, but this must not be allowed to compromise the operational imperatives. Where a multitude of officials are speaking to the press, this has the potential to exacerbate the confusion. It is therefore vitally important that the media are provided with a press point where they are addressed by a single spokesperson for consistency of message.
Intelligence Issues
A number of reports and leaked documents have emerged in the aftermath of the Lahore attack that allege that information regarding a potential attack on the Sri Lankan team came into the hands of the authorities in Punjab and were passed to police about a month before. However, it is claimed that while the reports were discussed by police and politicians, they were not acted on due to turbulence in the state's government at that time.
In order to pursue terrorists and those that sponsor them, and protect the public and Pakistan’s interests, it is vital that the intelligence processes are working effectively. However, there appears to be a growing consensus that the events in Lahore merely highlight the significant challenges faced by the Pakistan intelligence services.
Any subsequent inquiry should identify the true extent of any intelligence failings in relation to the Lahore attack, particularly around the advanced warnings, and identify areas for improvement. In particular, it would be important to determine the degree of current dialogue between the Pakistan Intelligence Services and the police. However, the real intelligence world is not always as clear cut as it may have been portrayed. One of the problems is that the various Pakistan intelligence agencies may have received so many warnings that did not come to anything that they grew complacent about taking any of them seriously.
However, the fact remains that intelligence is the lifeblood of security, whether it is in the pursuit of terrorists or in preventing their activity. While there are technical ways of gathering information, at the same time efforts need to continue to encourage the alertness of people living and working in communities. This requires a huge investment in developing community policing and the secure intelligence systems necessary to gain the confidence and reassurance of such communities, elements of whom may currently agree with the aims or ideology of the attackers.
Ultimately, most information will come from readily available. open-sources, including the Internet. However, all of this information has little real value unless it is properly analysed to turn it into intelligence and then properly disseminated and acted upon.
Capacity & Capability
Beyond intelligence, it is important to have strong capacity and capability i.e. sufficient numbers of properly trained and equipped security resources. Pakistan apparently has around 380,000 police nationally, with around 166,000 in the Punjab. Despite relatively large human resources, Pakistan police appear to be incapacitated by a lack of money, equipment and training. A Pakistani constable makes on average around $80 a month, compared with about $170 for a Taliban foot soldier.
Even in aid terms, a recent report showed that the U.S. aid gave the Pakistan military just under $100m last year, in contrast to $4.9 million for law enforcement and the judicial system. The Information Minister Sherry Rahman said recently that the Pakistani government recognised the need to train, develop and equip local police, but Pakistan has little money for such investment and needed help from the international community.
Poorly trained and equipped security resources will always be at a disadvantage when faced with well trained and equipped terrorists, determined to engage in indiscriminate multiple and simultaneous attacks to inflict mass fatalities and casualties using whatever means necessary, without concern for their own safety.